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Abstract. The 5.7 million small to medium enterprises (SMEs) in the
U.K. play a vital role in the national economy, contributing 51% of the
private sector. However, the cyber threats for SMEs are increasing with
four in ten of businesses experiencing a cyber attack in the last twelve
months. One significant treatment of this growing concern is in the imple-
mentation of long-established information security standards and best-
practices. Yet, most SMEs are not undergoing the certication process,
even though the current threats are now widely published by the gov-
ernment. In this paper, we look at the disconnect of cyber threats faced
by SMEs considering their current security postures and perceptions.
We also identify the influencing factors needed to improve security be-
haviours and engagements with information security best-practices. We
then propose a new foundational composite cybersecurity rating scheme
aimed at SMEs. The focus of our scheme is to ascertain and measure
the security behaviours, perceptions and risk propensity of each SME,
as well as their technical systems. To that end, we define our 5x5 ma-
trices based scheme by combining the measurements ascertained from
the behavioural as well as technical audits. The preliminary evaluation
results demonstrate that this approach provides a higher level of insight,
engagement and accuracy as to an SME’s individual security posture.
Keywords: Cybersecurity · Data Security · Information Security · Cy-
ber Essentials · ISO 27001 · SMEs · Security Behaviours · Risk Propen-
sity.
1 Introduction
In 2018, a survey done by the U.K. government revealed that four in ten U.K.
businesses suffered a cyber-attack within the last twelve months, with the average
cost for an SME of £1,570 per attack[13]. However, another survey [9] on the
security of small business showed that less than a quarter of small businesses
cited cybersecurity as one of their top concerns. There appears to be a disconnect
in what SMEs, particularly smaller businesses, perceive as top risks when asked.
This contradictory situation is in a time when in May 2018, the U.K. put into
force the new data protection regulation [20]. This regulation now places the
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onus and legal requirements on businesses to not only protect their data, but to
also proactively notify the Information Commissioner’s Office of any breaches or
face serious financial consequences such as fines of up to 4% global turnover or
e20 million .
Running in parallel with this concern is the increasing requirement within
the public sector to engage SMEs and push businesses into achieving a recog-
nised cyber or information standard before being allowed into the procurement
process. The U.K. Government has gone further and set a 2022 target of achiev-
ing 33% procurement of all their contracts undertaken by SMEs [8]. As this aim
of the government moves forward, it produces opportunities, but it also presents
significant challenges. The perception and current security postures of SMEs,
especially around data and information security risks, are critical challenges.
Consequently, these challenges contribute to the lack of SMEs’ engagement to
existing standards. Cyber Essentials [26] and ISO 27001 [21] are the two prime
examples that provide the key criterion for working with the government; how-
ever, the take up of these standards is still very low since the release of Cyber
Essentials in June 2014 and [21] last major update in 2015. As the U.K. Gov-
ernment’s own Minister for Digital and Culture admitted [17], just over 0.1% of
the 5.7 million SMEs in the U.K. have undertaken Cyber Essentials even though
that was particularly designed to help facilitate and encourage smaller businesses
to achieve a recognised standard.
This paper proposes a new robust and consumer-friendly cyber rating scheme.
This scheme provides better personalised security insights of the persons reason-
able for a business and how their behaviours, awareness and risk propensity
impact on these insights. Following are the core principles which defines the new
composite cybersecurity rating scheme:
– To provide a preliminary outline of a robust consumer-friendly cyber rating
scheme which considers the technical requirements, as well as the behavioural
insights of SMEs, through a new composite rating threshold-based model.
– To devise a scheme which has the capability of promoting and incentivising
secure behaviours as well as helping encourage progression into recognised
information security standards.
– Enable higher levels of protection and increase informed decision-making
opportunities for consumers and organisations within a supply chain.
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates related work.
Section 3 outlines the proposed model design and Section 4 demonstrates the
initial evaluations using expert interviews and two quantitative surveys. Section
5 concludes and presents future research workstreams.
2 Related Work
This section discusses the related work in the key research areas required to start
defining a new scheme.
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2.1 SME security behaviours and perceptions
When looking at the literature concerning U.K. SME security behaviours and
perceptions, the options are quite limited. [18] identified some attitudinal changes
needed within SMEs to increase the uptake in existing security standards. The
big hypothesis put forward is that SMEs choose not to spend on information
security as they believe the risks are acceptable and, therefore, do not see the
benefits of investing in this area. This suggests that SMEs need clear, short-term
and measurable benefits or incentives to better embrace cyber and data security.
Another study [16] identified that perception is a major factor which has become
engrained in the small business culture to prevent a rm fully understanding the
risks and costly mistakes made by uninformed employees. It also highlights the
perception of information assurance as a field of concern and concedes that
some form of financial assistance and cyber insurance products do have some
impact. However, it can be argued that this study do not cover national and
more widespread impacts to facilitate the culture change needed.
Another factor outlined to try drive more secure behaviours is with the use
of industry products. This leads to another assertion around current behaviours
within SMEs relating to market failure. It is argued that the market did help
drive the development of products such as cyber insurance, but as discussed
in [34], less than 2% of all businesses in the U.K. in 2016 had taken up that
insurance option due to the complexity of the offerings of insurance companies.
Although SMEs are aware of the law, they disconnect to the reality of the
threats, how relevant they are for their business and, also, cannot justify the
effort to reward ratio in implementing a more secure posture. Therefore, it is
logical to suggest that without the basics such as enforceable legislative or finan-
cial drivers in place, there is an apathy shown towards standards and investments
into cybersecurity by smaller businesses when cost control is such a major chal-
lenge. There are several factors that need to be analysed to understand the
behaviours of SMEs around cyber or information security. [5] suggests the fo-
cus of research has been too centred around a single behavioural trait; namely
policy compliance. This is further narrowed as the outcome variable is set to
the ‘intention to comply with the information security policy’. This approach
lacks several other factors such as organisational security maturity and legisla-
tive obligations and the questionable perception that SMEs fully understand the
legal implications or requirements.
2.2 Attitudes and awareness to cyber or information security
standards
[18] suggests that smaller companies would not undertake the larger establish
standards such as ISO 27001. And it indicated attitudes and awareness related
challenges including lack of internal expertise or understanding the risks of not
having such a system in place; the cost to implement and manage the standard;
the complexity of implementing the standard; SMEs perceived ISO27001 suit-
able for only larger organisations. Similarly, [1] suggests that, “...cost and lack
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of awareness of the standard contents act as a main barrier for adopting the
standard ISO 27001”. [18] was written only a year after the scheme had been
officially released. However, the follow-up paper [19] was two years after Cyber
Essentials had been released, but this still showed a low take up of the scheme. It
showed that out of a total of 1688 Cyber Essentials and CE Plus certifications,
540, 777, 352 and 19 certificates were issued by CREST, IASME, QMGS and
APMG certification bodies, respectively.
A recent survey [33] highlights that overall only 9% of UK businesses were
aware of the Cyber Essentials scheme. This percentage increased in another sur-
vey [32] which showed 21% of UK businesses were aware of Information Security
Management 27001. It disclosed that around 70% of U.K. SMEs are not aware
of the recognised certifications in cyber or information security.
2.3 Comparable behaviours and approaches from other industries
This section looks at other industries that have implemented assurance schemes
and how they have successfully influenced behaviours within SMEs. A compa-
rable area that has come from reviewing related work shows the areas of health
and environmental activities as one to further investigate [3]. One example is
[6] who argues that health psychology has connected relevance to cybersecurity
psychology as health behaviours are similarly sensitive to that of information
security.
In the U.K., the Food Standards Agency has successfully implemented a local
authority mandated scheme called the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS)
[14]. The FHRS rating system is measured on the standards of food hygiene
found at a business following an inspection. This then allows consumers to make
an informed decision on whether to eat at that business based on the assessed
hygiene standards, measured from 1 worst to 5 the best. This mandated scheme
has proved to be a driver to encourage businesses not performing well to do better
and those that are achieving high scores, to use that as a marketing tool to attract
customers. Consumers are used to seeing number ratings or star-based scores for
areas like hotel ratings, business reviews, and food hygiene as they provide an
instant and understandable reference point to help enable a consumers buying
decision. When looking at how to drive-up standards in SMEs, FHRS provides
additional insight as reported by BBC News [4], who showed a significant rise
in Welsh businesses aiming and achieving the top 5 rating, which was up from
45% to just under 61% in 2015. It also reported that the “ratio of firms rated
satisfactory or better (scores 3 to 5) rose from 86.9% to 94.4%, while the number
of outlets with a zero-rating halved from 134 to 61, around one in 500”.
Treating cybersecurity like the Government treats infectious diseases is a
must, and it is widely accepted that individuals are responsible to make life
choices to improve their own well-being, though we also often engage in some
degree of risky behavior [28]. FHRS aims to reduce the incidence of food borne
illness and the associated costs to the economy. A similar objective can be argued
for cybersecurity, where the aim is to reduce the incidences of data breaches and
cybercrimes and the associated costs and disruption to the economy, business,
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and the public. Hence, the need of aligning the merits of cybersecurity with an
established scheme such as FHRS.
2.4 Information availability and its dispersion to SMEs
A key challenge identified was around how SMEs find security-related informa-
tion and the impact the dispersion of information has had on the SMEs security
posture [34, 35, 2]. These studies highlight the confusing landscape that the vast
array of online channels offer when searching for information. The key question
is how to deliver consistency as the content is not regulated? It is not clear how
an SME would judge whether the source is trustworthy, or that the guidance
given is relevant for them. SMEs are confused about what information to go
with due to the sheer volume of available data and, often, do not know where to
begin. The study [34] showed that only 7% of businesses consulted government
websites and the Government’s survey showed only 2%. It argues that for the
sake of publicity, concerned news or media reports tend to focus on high-profile
data breach cases even if similar attacks happen against SMEs. That may lead
to the misguided assumption that SMEs are not at risk. Hence, the Govern-
ment’s attempts at priming or a warning SMEs do not influence the degree of
information disclosure [22].
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)
organisation did provide a contribution in this topic around an effective way to
share information through the utilisation of the U.K.’s Cybersecurity Informa-
tion Sharing Partnership (CISP)[12] . This would position CISP as a trusted
exchange partner for business to seek guidance on cyber threats and data se-
curity issues. ENISA [12] does state, “Such an initiative requires high levels of
trust that maybe difficult to achieve amongst large groups of participants”. That
seems to be a fair assessment of SMEs sharing their information, which raises
the question as to whether using anything associated to the Government would
be deemed suspicious by SMEs as trust in the U.K. Government has broadly
remained unchanged since 2017 at 36% [11].
2.5 Drivers to help deliver increases in positive security behaviours
[30] suggests that management can increase compliance in the domain of infor-
mation security, by using the social bond theory and the involvement theory
as encourages sharing of knowledge and collaboration. Several useful areas were
rationalised around how to engage and develop behavioural changes more effec-
tively[5]. One area put forward was the use of vignettes to highlight behaviours
as it helps remove the need to admit to personal information but still gain insight
into the person’s behavioural traits. In addition, individuals are influenced by
subconscious cues and this “priming” through visualisation is an important ele-
ment needed for behavioural change. A further driver raised for consideration is
around incentivisation the U.K. government introduced a now defunct scheme of
5,000 innovation vouchers for SMEs back in 2013 [15]. These vouchers could be
used to improve information security aspects but even though the actual number
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of vouchers taken up is unclear, the take up was at a level the government saw
as not being effective. Therefore, three years later from its introduction they
were ceased. This outcome partly supports that market failure is a major factor
in the low adoption of standards. The five drivers were compliance with laws
and regulations, protection of brand and reputation, physical cost of a breach,
market pressure for a recognised standard, and stock market price [25, 18].
Several barriers can be extrapolated from the literature that the U.K. SMEs
need to face when trying to achieve positive cybersecurity postures [27, 7, 2, 23].
These barriers include: lack of time or financial resource; lack of understand-
ing the risks or threats; lack of incentives to undertake standards or change
behaviours; lack of pressure for cyber security within their supply chain or via
consumers; lack of compliance drivers; lack of trust in experts or quality of in-
formation (including a single source); lack of expertise within the business; and
unclear or confusing legislation requirements. These studies also highlight poten-
tial opportunities to overcome these barriers that include: protecting cashflow;
focusing IT expenditure to deliver the most impact and best ROI; cleansing cus-
tomer databases for higher engagement and response rates; reducing applicable
costs such as cyber insurance or IT financing; better understanding the risks and
potential threats for the business; opening new market or business opportunities
to support business growth; and developing a competitive advantage. Although
any SME will have different weighting ratios of importance against their iden-
tified risk factors, the following key research gaps were identified in achieving
positive cybersecurity postures for the UK SMEs:
– The perceived benefits for implementing security standards are outlined. But
these benefits did not appear to be a compelling solution to help encourage
and facilitate U.K. SMEs to take up those standards outside of it being a
requirement for a public sector contract.
– Behavioural models are discussed, but a clearly defined incentive-based model
that understands the motivational influences for U.K. SMEs to engage in
more secure behaviours was missing.
– Several points are raised around needing a nationally mandated model but
seemed to just use existing standards even though the market had shown
a relatively low take up to date. Therefore, a foundational solution is re-
quired that could be mandated, but it must also demonstrate a relevant
value proposition to an SME to be deemed as highly advantageous.
– Further work is needed to ascertain how cybersecurity information is ob-
tained and the perceived complexity of it, including the potential impact.
The literature also suggest a gap of a single-source trusted information point
that is not government controlled.
– There was a lack of a solution that could address informed decision making
by consumers around cyber or data security, which also could be used by
industry as a benchmark.
– Comparable behaviours in other industries are discussed, but no actual so-
lution is suggested to make effective use of that behavioural approach.
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These identified gaps also facilitate the identification of the external and
internal influencing factors and their likely collective outcomes when looking at
safer behaviours and developing a more secure organisational culture. Since the
current standards do not capture and help form the behavioural basis, it has
provided the necessary insights to develop a new model.
3 Proposed Rating system
This section presents the proposed cyber rating scheme.
3.1 System evaluation method
The literature highlights limitations of the current cybersecurity standards such
as theory choices to influence positive security behaviours, encouraging factors
for standards adoption, ineffectiveness of standards, approach aligned with a
comparable industry and standards, perceptions and awareness of SMEs. After
analysing these limitations, we defined six hypotheses (H) to influence and refine
the development of the new cybersecurity-based rating scheme for SMEs:
H1 Incentive theories will influence security behaviours more effectively compared to
rational choice theories.
H2 Widespread adoption of a cybersecurity standard requires mandated local author-
ity compliance.
H3 Cybersecurity needs to be more aligned with environmental health in its appreci-
ation and delivery process.
H4 Businesses lack awareness and perception of relevance or value with current cy-
bersecurity standards.
H5 Perceived complexity in cybersecurity perpetuates inactivity and a higher risk
acceptance due to the scale of the issue and the diversity of information available.
H6 Giving people rational security information does not guarantee positive behaviour
change.
Below are the evaluation methods defined to test the validity of the six noted
hypotheses (Section 3.1) and the feasibility of a new scheme:
– Quantitative and qualitative surveys - To provide a data collection method
from a question set around technical and behavioural concerns associated
with cyber and data security. Also, to gather feedback and positions from
areas SMEs experienced or perceived.
– Expert interviews - Through unstructured interviews with industry and aca-
demic experts generate qualitative data and gain a deeper understanding of
their views and their expert feedback against the submitted hypotheses
3.2 Proposed rating methods
The relatively low take up of existing standards, primarily focus on technical
and management systems when undertaking audits. It is also true to highlight
the growing threats to SMEs [24], yet there still is a lack of awareness or even
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Table 1. Mapping the new scheme sections to the five sections in Cyber Essentials.
Sr. No New Scheme Technical Sections Cyber Essential Control Sections
1 Protecting Your Network Firewalls and Internet Gateways
2 Ensuring Your Systems Are Securely Configured Secure Configuration
3 Controlling Who Accesses Your Systems Access Control
4 Protecting Against Malware Malware Protection
5 Keeping Your Systems Up-To-Date Patch Management
the implementation of security measures. As only 49% of businesses not having
implemented the government’s five basic technical controls from Cyber Essen-
tials; hence, this approach is not working [13]. H6 states providing information,
regardless of how rational the arguments, is not enough to positively change be-
haviours. It also supports the view that rational choice theories are not enough to
bring the change; there may be an opportunity for a better incentivised approach
to deliver success (H1).
A key part of the proposed approach is in the measuring of an SMEs security
posture and being able to generate a single-digit (1 to 5) rating to illustrate the
cyber competence and data security effectiveness of that business. To achieve
this rating, the paper proposes utilising two distinct audit areas to generate a
composite rating. The two proposed areas are the SME’s security behaviours
and their technical systems. The aim being to understand both the technical
systems in place to provide mitigation against the various cyber threats as well
as understand and, where needed, influence the SMEs behaviours in how those
systems are utilised, managed and improved.
One half of the rating function will focus on the technical aspects and for
ease of progression will be aligned with Cyber Essentials. The technical audit
will cover five sections similar to Cyber Essentials, with Table 1 illustrating how
the new scheme’s technical audit sections would map across to Cyber Essential’s
current five sections. The other half of the rating function focuses on behaviours
and risk propensity of an SME. From the literature review and industry analysis
(i.e., expert reviews as described in Section 4.2), the first iteration of a new
quadrant behavioural model has been developed to illustrate what influences
may affect an SME’s security posture and then allow for levels of weighting to
be applied depending on the ratings scored during the audit process.
Fig. 1 shows the assembled behavioural influencing model, named the ‘Fan
of Influence’, and the four distinct segments derived from it are: Fig. 1 shows
the assembled new model, named the ‘Fan of Influence’, derived from the com-
bined analysis of peer research, internal testing, and expert interviews. The four
distinct segments deriving from Fig.1 include:
(a) Perception and Understanding [P&U] segment relates to decision influencing
coming from how the respondent views and perceives the relevance, threat,
risk, and trust of information available. It also covers awareness and how the
respondent views the effort to reward ratio.
(b) External (Personal) [EXT (P)] segment relates to external decision influenc-
ing coming from within the respondent(s) peer (social or work) network and
from past experiences.
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Fig. 1. Proposed behavioural influencing model for an SME’s security posture.
(c) External (Inform and Service) [EXT (I&S)] segment relates to external de-
cision influencing coming from entities or organisations that the respondent
may interface with during normal business operations. This could be areas
which have a greater influence on the respondent(s) business operations such
as the supply chain or the vendors they use.
(d) Regulation and Requirements [R&R] segment relates to fixed decision mak-
ing which are typically a requirement (be it legally or as a standard) which
the respondent must follow. There is usually little to no influence the busi-
ness themselves could have on these factors.
This behavioural influencing model concept allows each of the four segments
(and/or segment piece) to be weighted depending on the business and the threat
requirements generated through dynamic means, such as intelligence-based de-
cision making [10]. The ability for this model to incorporate individualistic in-
fluencing factors and recognise the context of an SME’s security decision mak-
ing, helps improve the opportunity of better SME engagement. It also develops
positive security behavioural change through SME owners understanding the
relevant value proposition to their business and the potential benefits of imple-
menting such measures aligned to the current and changing threat landscape.
This level of granularity and behavioural analysis provides a distinctly differ-
ent approach to existing security standards. It is envisaged that the proposed
behavioural model would utilise a top-to-bottom approach when dealing with
cybersecurity improvements and issues as SMEs are typically owner-led which is
the vital source for delivering an organisation-wide culture of security. The chal-
lenges to information security best practices and corporate culture come from
at least three factors: level of threat perceived, location, and lack of cooperation
and communication between management and staff. Recent research has shown
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that positive information security culture encourages security-vigilant behaviour
of employees and therefore can help to avoid human-related security breaches
[7].
3.3 Defining the rating matrices
The proposed scheme would use a composite rating based upon two layers of
assessments; namely the behavioural and technical audit scores. The result will
deliver a single-digit score aiming to be easily understood by consumers and
businesses alike.
In terms of the scoring matrices themselves, we propose the use of a recog-
nised 5x5 approach [29, 31]. Typically, the size of a matrix tends to be a personal
choice and aligned to many aspects, such as what is used by the industry? or
what customers require to use? The 5x5 size of the chosen matrices will provide
enough granularity when defining priorities for secure behaviours and identifying
consequences of threats and maps well for the proposed composite rating and
its associated thresholds needed to define a single-digit visible rating. This size
of matrix is also compatible with the recognised standards of Cyber Essentials,
ISO 27001/05, and IEC 31010.
The first layer required to generate the composite rating is based on results
from the audit around an SME’s behaviours and risk propensity. This scoring fo-
cusses on aspects of insecure behaviours which would impact on the business and
its customers. It is envisaged that the first layer of scoring (see Fig. 2) measures
the likelihood of insecure behaviours against the consequences to the business,
with the highest score demonstrating the most insecure behaviour posture. This
rating will be used with the technical audit score to produce the nal composite
score.
To deliver an actionable plan from the first layer findings, an additional phase
within the behaviour layer is required. This phase will utilise the behavioural
models outlined in Section 3.2 to identify priorities which have the maximum op-
portunity to inuence secure behavioural change in that SME. This phase scoring
is based on the premise that just identifying insecure behaviours is not enough
and identification of actions is also required. Regular undertaking of this ap-
proach will ensure continual improvement as it will assist with the denition of
priorities through the individually identified influencing factors for each busi-
ness and ensure costs and outcomes are aligned to that business’ objectives.
Any identified action implemented or not could then influence the scoring fol-
lowing a review of the first phase. Both Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 use the proposed
scoring matrix dimension, and each provides a key as to how the numbers are
interpreted in terms of priorities for action or in measuring the impact of inse-
cure behaviours. The score from Fig. 3 is not currently used in the composite
score as it is designed to be remedial only.
The second layer to be scored is around the technical and systems side of a
business. For this, the information is gathered using a modified audit from the
Cyber Essentials standard. That then enables the promotion of the five baseline
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Fig. 2. Phase 1 of behavioural scoring matrix around an SME’s security posture.
Fig. 3. Phase 2 of behavioural scoring matrix around an SME’s security posture.
controls needed for business and streamlines the progression to achieve Cyber Es-
sentials certification. The proposed 5x5 matrix is based on two measures: threat
likelihood and business consequences. Much like a traditional risk assessment of
impact and likelihood, this structure allows for any easier way to understand
the risks for a business and therefore, its customers. That is a vital piece of
knowledge when looking to design a rational and comprehensive cyber rating.
Fig. 4 shows the proposed scoring matrix and provides a key as to how the num-
bers are interpreted in terms of business consequences. The score generated from
this matrix and the summation from the results from Fig. 2 provides the final
composite rating (see Section 3.4).
3.4 Composite scoring
A key foundation to the need of this composite rating is that the current stan-
dards are lacking understanding of SME’s behaviour and risk propensity. Part of
the implementation of this scheme is to develop fresh approaches which achieve
perception change around cybersecurity and deliver safer behaviours by under-
standing and influencing behaviours through personalised motivating factors.
Therefore, to achieve this, the process is to take the results from both matrices
shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 and generate the final score from a summation of those
two matrices. Fig. 5 shows the thresholds and its associated rating. The threshold
can be refined based on further research, but with the use of a 5x5 for the two
scoring models it allows for most of the results to fit within ‘Satisfactory’ ratings
and below and provide a higher threshold for ‘Good’ and ‘Excellent’ ratings. This
is seen as desirable as businesses should be at a high level in both of the audited
layers to demonstrate secure behaviours as well as secure systems as a business
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Fig. 4. Proposed 5x5 scoring matrix around an SME’s technical risk and threat vul-
nerability.
Fig. 5. Proposed composite table to derive the new schemes final security rating.
must have at least one ‘5’ rating to achieve a ‘Good’ or above. It also means
businesses have to score at least 50% in total to be deemed ‘Satisfactory’. The
min and max percentage ranges in Fig. 5 show the range of scores that would
be achieved in that rating’s banding.
The threshold for the scoring follows the model of the previously discussed
FHRS rating in Section 2.3, as that has been a proven model which has been
both successfully implemented and managed regionally.
Once a composite rating is calculated from Fig.5, it then leads to the visi-
ble rating seen by consumers and businesses. To further align it with successful
models, such as FHRS, the proposed scheme will use a simplified and recog-
nised scoring approach of 1 to 5 stars with a simple rating explanation included
(columns three and four of Fig.5). A rating of zero is not included as that would
mean the business is unrated and failed the audit. This approach is to imme-
diately provide consumers and other businesses the ability to make informed
decisions as these ratings would be visually displayed at the entrance, near the
payment area and online.
4 Evaluation
This section presents the initial scheme testing and evaluation strategy. Following
the defined system evaluation methods (described in Section 3.1), the testing will
be done over two distinct methods: (a) quantitative surveys with at least one
qualitative question and (b) expert non-structured interviews. These evaluation
methods are designed for preliminary evaluation of the scheme, but the results
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Table 2. Profiles of experts.
Expert
Reference
Background Expertise and Experience
Expert 1 Academia and re-
search
Noted and published professor in cybersecurity with vast research ex-
perience in human-centred security and behaviours towards business
(especially SME sizes) and cyber and data security.
Expert 2 Financial and le-
gal industry
Head of innovation within a large, blue-chip service organisation spe-
cialising in offering financial and legal products for business. Oversees
innovation projects such as one with machine learning based on be-
haviours.
Expert 3 Local government Information Governance Manager for a large district council. Over-
sees multi-agency information sharing to ensure processing is compli-
ant with data protection legislation. Remit also includes awareness of
governance and training through the boroughs and local enterprises
around many cyber and data centric subjects.
Expert 4 Local government Information Governance Manager for a city council. Many years of
experience in all areas of governance and information assurance, in-
cluding working with local authority business development teams to
help local businesses grow. Also, has long experience with data secu-
rity regulations and supply chain procurement processes within the
local authority.
Expert 5 Banking industry Lead manager in digital engagement for a major international bank.
Their role focuses on businesses with turnovers up to 6 million and
is tasked to help provide guidance and raise awareness in cyber and
information security. Proven experience in training and event pre-
senting with an expertise in cyber fraud.
do provide evidence around its feasibility and applicability and help form a
foundation for further extensive testing and research.
4.1 Surveys
There were two surveys completed: a technical and a behavioural survey with
the same 15 respondents and with 10 questions in each questionnaire to collect
both quantitative and qualitative data. The sample size is too small to be rep-
resentative of the SME population. However, the conducted surveys do provide
indicative conclusions and useful insights to support the initial evaluation of the
new scheme.
The results from the technical controls and systems survey are given below:
– Nearly 9 in 10 businesses (87%) stated they had one or more firewalls pro-
tecting their network. However, 54% of those businesses stated that they do
not regularly review their firewall rules.
– A third of all surveyed businesses admitted that they do use the same pass-
word across multiple accounts, with 80% of all surveyed micro businesses
stating that they did this.
– 8 out 10 surveyed businesses stated that they change their passwords every
quarter or twice a year, with only around 1 in 10 (13%) stating their change
passwords monthly or less.
– 6 out of 10 surveyed businesses stated that they did have a user account
creating process, but 80% of micro and 33% of small-sized businesses said
they did not.
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– The majority (53%) of surveyed businesses indicated that they did not have
anti-virus or malware protection for every Internet-enabled device, which
included 83% of all small-sized businesses. From those that did have malware
protection, businesses regularly scanned for viruses daily/weekly or monthly.
– 60% of all surveyed businesses did state that they ensured at ‘most times’
they had the latest updates on installed software.
– Over 7 in 10 businesses (73%) stated that they did not perform regular vul-
nerability scans on their owned networks, with only medium-sized businesses
stating that they did.
The results from the behavioural and risk propensity survey are given below:
– A third of surveyed businesses did not consider cyber threats or data loss a
significant risk to them.
– Most businesses felt that GDPR was relevant to their business (60% stated
fairly or very relevant responses). However, most businesses (80%) found the
new data protection regulations fairly or very difficult to understand.
– Almost equal amount of businesses was aware of Cyber Essentials and ISO
27001 (53% to 47% were not aware of them) with 100% of Accommodation
and food services businesses and 66% of Professional, scientific, and technical
businesses not being aware of Cyber Essentials.
– The majority of businesses (66%), especially the Education businesses sur-
veyed, would speak to friends or colleagues when wanting help on a cyber-
security issue.
– Most businesses (73%) found understanding information on cybersecurity to
be either fairly or very difficult to understand, especially from the small-sized
businesses surveyed.
– A third of businesses felt like there was not enough information about cy-
bersecurity available to them, but 40% of businesses stated that there was
either slightly too much or overall, too much information available.
– Trust in the information available was reasonable with 47% trusting most of
the information with 53% trusting some of it.
– The most stated theme when looking at what cybersecurity areas the sur-
veyed businesses needed help with was around compliance and auditing. The
two main technical responses were around network security & threat anal-
ysis and incident handling. The other key theme raised was around better
training, guidance and awareness.
4.2 Expert interviews
The experts selected for unstructured interviews fitted across the following three
profiles: commercial or industry, academia, and local government. These profiles
helped to give a broad understanding of the various aspects associated with the
proposed scheme. Table 2 lists the profiles of the five experts engaged with for
this paper.
During expert interviews, the initial discussions were on the expert’s experi-
ence and thoughts around a new foundational scheme in cybersecurity for SMEs.
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Table 3. Summary of experts supportive of the hypotheses from section 3.1
Hypotheses Supported By
H1 Incentive theories will influence security behaviours more effectively com-
pared to rational choice theories.
Experts 1, 2.
H2 Widespread adoption of a cyber security standard requires mandated local
authority compliance.
Experts 3, 4.
H3 Cybersecurity needs to be more aligned with environmental health in its
appreciation and delivery to business.
Experts 2.
H4 Businesses lack awareness and perception of relevance or value with cur-
rent cyber security standards.
Experts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
H5 Perceived complexity in cyber security perpetuates inactivity and a higher
risk acceptance due to the scale of the issue and the diversity of informa-
tion available.
Experts 2, 3, 4, 5.
H6 Giving people rational security information does not guarantee positive
behaviour change.
Experts 1, 2, 5.
In addition, the six hypotheses from Section 3.2 were discussed. Table 3 lists the
six hypotheses and, the experts who supported each of these statements.
5 Conclusion and Future work
To sum up, there is a perception of complexity around cyber and data secu-
rity, especially with the new data protection regulations, and a big area that
is needed is behavioural change. The U.K. Government wants more SMEs in-
volved in their supply chain but there is little evidence to suggest that there will
be enough secure and well managed SMEs in terms of cybersecurity that could
help achieve that aim. To that extent, the movement away from purely rational
choice-based theories and information dispersion needs to be looked in-depth as
this paper has suggested. The proposed system helps gain a personalised un-
derstanding of the risk propensity and influences on secure behaviours for each
business, rather than just what secure technical systems and policies are in place.
Further work is needed to generate larger levels of evidence, but it demonstrated
there are core reasons around why SMEs are not embracing the merits of robust
cybersecurity standards and best-practices more widely, such as Cyber Essen-
tials which was specifically developed to engage U.K. SMEs, Awareness of such
standards and the perceived relevance and risk propensity are major factors for
the current market failures. To make this scheme a success, these factors would
need to be addressed. This could be achieved by following the FHRS model of
enforcing such a programme at regional level through local government author-
ities mandating any businesses handling personal data as an example and then
the composite approach involving understanding and measuring behaviours and
influencing factors to ensure that SMEs are engaged through relevant, person-
alised measurements and actionable plans which generate value-based outcomes
and develop positive security behavioural change. The immediate future work
includes:
– Undertake larger survey base to test and refine the two-layer audit model for
robust testing of the ‘Fan of Influence’ model and the six hypotheses. Develop
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the required audits against the two-layered scoring models and then map the
answers to suitable scoring within the matrices.
– Develop a new model for the weighting ratio required for the proposed
scheme as a 50/50 ratio would not be reflective of industry needs. The new
weighting model could utilise intelligence-based decision making from data
generated by accredited national security surveys and other such industry
accepted sources. Attack types could then be sub-divided into behavioural-
based (or the human error factor) and technically-based to facilitate a dy-
namic annual weighting to be applied to the composite rating process which
would focus the weighting ratio on the current threat landscape each year
and not rely on the knowledge of the persons undertaking their risk assess-
ments within the current security frameworks.
– Further develop the incentivised benefits and drivers, including investigating
a mandated supply chain process which could be mirrored within the public
sector at a regional level.
– Extend the mapping exercises of the new scheme against ISO 27001 and Cy-
ber Essentials to see what percentage of each standard have been undertaken
and, therefore, provide a visual guidance to a business in how much more
work is required to meet other standards to further encourage take-up.
– Include analysis on other non-U.K. standards, such as NIST-800 and the
Cybersecurity Framework to identify if anything of value could be learned
which helps facilitate this model being utilised in other countries.
– Carry out a detailed quantitative pilot study within chosen regional locations
and with approximately 20-30 active business. Using sectors, such as retail,
would provide responses from both consumers and businesses on their per-
ceptions of the new scheme and, having a visible cybersecurity rating may
allow for measurements in areas like commercial advantage and consumer
confidence which help develop the value proposition of the scheme.
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